THE CITIZEN AS LITIGANT IN PUBLIC
ACTIONS: THE NON-HOHFELDIAN
OR IDEOLOGICAL PLAINTIFF *
Lonis L. JAYFE f
Despite certain relevant facts and modem developments, it is still
holy writ that the citizen qua citizen is not a proper party plaintiff in a
lawsuit testing questions of constitutionality. Indeed, it is argued that
this is simply an illustration of a basic general proposition concerning
the proper function of the judiciary. This function is defined initially
in terms of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to certain "cases,
in law and equity," and certain "controversies." From the very beginning, the Supreme Court has held that its jurisdiction is limited to
these "cases" and "controversies." A similar doctrine prevails in most
of the states regardless of the precise form of the constitutional definition
of the judicial power. Thus, unless the state constitution specifically
provides for advisory opinions, the courts hold that they are without
power to give them.
The crucial question, then, is whether it is a necessary element of
a case that there be a plaintiff who proffers for judicial determination
a question concerning his own legal status. It may be something of
an analytic task to say what is meant by "a question concerning" the
plaintiff's legal status. One can fall back on Hohfeldian terminology.'
In those terms the meaning would be that the plaintiff is seeking a
determination that he has a right, a privilege, an immunity or a power.
Might we be permitted to characterize this plaintiff as a Hohfeldian or
ideological plaintiff?
Perhaps those who demand a Hohfeldian plaintiff would be prepared to relax the requirement to include plaintiffs who claim that the
defendant's action damages them in some appreciable fashion as distinguished from its effect on persons in general or in large, indeterminate groups. It has been suggested that the problem posed by such
* There is presently pending in the Supreme Court the case of Flast v. Gardner,
271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.), prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 895 (1967), raising the question whether plaintiffs, as citizens and as taxpayers, have standing to challenge federal
appropriations alleged to constitute an establishment of religion contrary to the first
amendment. See also 36 U.S.L.W. 3361-63 (Mar. 18, 1968) (summary of oral argument in the case).
t Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard University. A.B. 1925, Johns
Hopkins University. LL.B. 1928, S.J.D. 1932, Harvard University.
I Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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a plaintiff is not a true problem because allowing him to complain is
equivalent to recognizing that he does have a legally protected interest.
In other words, in such cases the question is not whether the plaintiff
has standing, but whether he has a right. This may indeed be so in
a particular case; but I would maintain that recognition of standing is
not necessarily equivalent to recognition of a right. This, I think, is
demonstrable in the case of the so-called taxpayer suit.' I do not
believe that the taxpayer can qualify even in an extended sense as a
Hohfeldian plaintiff. I do not speak of a suit by a taxpayer to enjoin
the collection of a tax, which clearly would satisfy the classical plaintiff
requirement, but of a suit to enjoin an expenditure. To justify this
suit in classical terms it is argued that, if the plaintiff wins, his tax
bill will be reduced. But the argument has no formal validity: the
plaintiff's tax lfability is not adjudicated in such a suit. Nor can it be
justified on the "realistic" ground that, because success will reduce his
tax bill, the taxpayer's interest is at least analogous to that of the
ordinary plaintiff. The allegedly illegal act may involve a large expenditure of money and the plaintiff may be, as Professor Davis points
out,' a Gargantuan taxpayer of the order of magnitude of General
Motors. But very few courts require that either the proposed expenditure or its effect on the plaintiff's tax bill be of any consequence
whatever. Thus, an Ohio taxpayer may attack the constitutionality
of a proposed method of adopting an amendment to the Constitution."
His supposed interest is the effect on his tax liability of printing the
proposal on a ballot. If a personal stake is a significant element of a
case, clearly this remote, virtually hypothetical monetary involvement
cannot supply that element. Thus the taxpayer suit must be accounted
for if it is to be justified as one form of citizen action.
Is a Hohfeldian plaintiff a necessary requisite of a case? I would
contend that whether the analysis proceeds in terms of history, logic
or policy the answer is "no." I would grant that the central function
of the courts is the determination of the individual's claim to "just"
treatment Where the citizen is demanding his legally prescribed due
in the form of money, property or the specific performance of an act,
or where he is resisting claims upon his property or his person, it is
a fundamental tenet of our legal system that there should be a tribunal
which will provide a disinterested determination of his claim. Neither
21 have canvassed in detail the whole subject of taxpayer and citizen actions in
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 459-501 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as JAFFE]. This chapter is a revision of Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial

Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961).
3 Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MIN.
91 (1955).
4 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
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the executive nor the legislature is as dependable as the judiciary in
making such determinations and, if necessary, we should exclude other
functions which might impair the judiciary's performance of this role.
Indeed, if we had to choose just one function for the judiciary we
should choose the administration of justice in this sense.
But it has not been true in the past, and it is even less true now,
that Anglo-American courts have been thus restricted by any requireThe prerogative court jurisdiction
ment of a Hohfeldian plaintiff.
of King's Bench-prohibition, certiorari, mandamus-could be set in
motion by a stranger to the official action, the legality of which it was
the office of the writ to test.5 What I have called the citizen's mandamus has been widely used in many, though not all, states as a means
of testing the validity-constitutional and statutory--of official action.
The taxpayer's action, which does not satisfy the requirements of a
Hohfeldian plaintiff, has (in one form or another) been rationalized
in nearly all of the states, sometimes by common law decision, sometimes by statute. And, as far as I know, none of these statutes has been
held invalid as imposing non-judicial functions on the courts.
Of particular importance in the posture of federal law is the line
of authority inaugurated by FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station.'
In Sanders, the Court construed a typical statutory provision allowing
an appeal by any "person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected" by a decision of the administrative agency. 7 An existing
radio broadcasting licensee attacked the grant of a radio license which
offered new competition. The Court insisted that the licensee had no
legally protected interest under the statute, no interest in being free
from competition.' Yet it was held to be a proper party under the
statute.9 It was, in the phrase of Judge Jerome Frank in Associated
Industries, Inc. v. Ickes,10 a "private Attorney General." Two years
later, Justices Douglas and Murphy, dissenting in Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. FCC,u argued that if the Communications Act is read
as not creating a substantive right in the appellant, the appeal by a
so-called "person aggrieved" does fiot satisfy the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy. In the face of this argument the Court
squarely held (per Frankfurter, J., a stout defender of the case or
5

See

JAFFE

462-75.

For a recent example, see Mariano v. Building Inspector,

233 N.E.2d 903 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1968).

,309 U.S. 470 (1940).

7 See, e.g., Communications Act,47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1964).

8309 U.S. at 473, 475.
9 Id. at 477.
10 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
11316 U.S.4,18 (1942) (Douglas & Murphy, JJ., dissenting).-
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controversy requirement) that "these private litigants have standing
only as representatives of the public interest." 12
Only recently has the large and basic significance of Sanders begun
to appear. It can be argued that Sanders does not depart from the requirement of the Hohfeldian plaintiff because the decision to give a
plaintiff standing is logically equivalent to giving him a substantive right
to be free from illegal conmpetition. But it would be difficult to analyze
in such terms the recent case of Scenic Hudson PreservationConference
v. FPC.'3 In this case a conservation society was held to have standing
to attack an order of the Federal Power Commission allowing the
location of a power storage plant on Storm King Mountain. One can,
no doubt, frame a logical sentence to the effect that this is equivalent to
a holding that persons and groups of persons interested in conservation
have a "right" that due weight be given to conservation in decisions
under a statute which mandates a concern for conservation. But this
is no different from stating that any citizen can bring an action to
enforce a law in which he is interested, because to allow him to bring
suit is equivalent to recognizing that he has a "right" to have the law
enforced. This obviously renders meaningless the supposed requirement of a Hohfeldian plaintiff, and is another way of saying that such
a plaintiff is not necessary to constitute a case or controversy. The
traditional requirement is one that distinguishes the particular plaintiff
from the generality of citizens, taxpayers, and so forth, and is required
precisely because the argument maintains that the administration of
justice is not designed to vindicate the interest of the fungible citizen
in the enforcement of the law. This plaintiff, it would be said, must
seek his relief from the political process where he, along with those
who feel as he does, will be represented by elected officials.
4
Furthermore, the Court, until Doremus v. Board of Education,'
6
had taken appellate jurisdiction of taxpayer"3 and citizen mandamus'
cases properly instituted in the state courts. This dearly assumes that
they are cases and controversies. Mr. Justice Jackson in Doremus
distinguished Everson v. Board of Education' on the ground that in
the latter case the plaintiff "showed a measurable appropriation or
disbursement of school-district funds." 18 It was apparent, he stated,
12316 U.S. at 14.

13 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
342 U.S. 429 (1952).
15See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cochran v. Board
of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Crampton v.
14

Zabrislde, 101 U.S. 601 (1879).

16 See, e.g., Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
17 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
:8 342 U.S. at 434.
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that what was sought to be litigated in Everson was not a "direct
dollars-and-cents injury" but "a religious difference." '0 But in Hawke
v. Smith 0 a state taxpayer sought successfully to test whether a proposed method of ratifying amendments to the Constitution was consistent with the procedure provided by article V. The only cost involved was the printing of the proposal on the ballot. In Koenig v.
Flynn 2 a citizen of New York was permitted to raise the constitutionality of a joint resolution of the state legislature establishing voting
districts, despite the fact that there was no allegation of any monetary
interest or concern. It seems not even to have occurred to the Justices
that their jurisdiction was questionable. Furthermore, Doremus completely overlooked Sanders and its progeny of "private litigants" who
"have standing only as representatives of the public interest." 22 Clearly
it is too late to contend that a non-Hohfeldian plaintiff offends the case
or controversy requirement.
What has been said so far goes to the proposition that the courts
of this country, including the Supreme Court, have taken jurisdiction
of proceedings initiated by non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs. The question
remains whether this line of authority should be encouraged. Are
these cases consistent with the functions of the case or controversy
requirement?
The usual justification for the requirement runs in terms of the
necessary conditions for the rational exercise of the judicial power.
The court, not being a representative institution, not having initiating
powers and not having a staff for the gathering of information, must
rely on the parties and their advocates to frame the problem and to
present the opposing considerations relevant to its solution. It is
argued that unless the plaintiff is a person whose legal position will
be affected by the court's judgment, he cannot be relied on to present
a serious, thorough, and complete argument. I do not know whether
there is any way of finding out whether non-Ilohfeldian plaintiffs are
less zealous than Hohfeldian ones. My own recourse is to my
understanding of human nature, which tells me that there is no
predictable difference between the two. If it were thought that selfaggrandizement is a more dependable motive than ideological interest,
I would point out that it usually requires a financial outlay to undertake a lawsuit, so that once launched on the lawsuit the ideological
plaintiff has, at least, committed a sum of money and so, in some
19 Id.
Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930), is also
20 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
a state taxpayer case.
21285 U.S. 375 (1932).
22 Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 1, 14 (1942).
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sense, has a financial investment to protect. But the very fact of
investing money in a lawsuit from which one is to acquire no further
monetary profit argues, to my mind, a quite exceptional kind of interest,
and one peculiarly indicative of a desire to say all that can be said in
the support of one's contention. From this I would conclude that,
insofar as the argument for a traditional plaintiff runs in terms of the
need for effective advocacy, the argument is not persuasive.
The second argument for a restrictive definition of case and controversy is that the judicial power-particularly in the constitutional
field-is inconsistent with the fundamental premises of a democratic
system and has proved to be a block to effective government. Seen in
this light, the case or controversy requirement is a device for limiting
judicial intervention to the minimum needed for the administration of
justice. Inevitably the exercise of that function involves lawmaking,
and it is precisely at that point that the judicial function runs afoul,
it is argued, of the premise that in a democracy laws are to be made
by a representative body acting under majority rule. I do not take
issue with the proposition that majority rule is at the heart of a
democracy as we know and understand it. But an unqualified majoritarian theory does not suffice for our lawmaking needs. On the one
hand, our practice-take for example the rules of our legislative
bodies-gives formal recognition to minority interests. And on the
other, we have always been aware that the effective power of minorities,
sometimes in combination, sometimes operating in the vacuum of mass
indifference, blocks the formation of effective majorities. In democracies, as in other forms of government, majorities are made by leaders
and elites.
I contend that judges, operating within the confines of the case
or controversy requirement, may help supply that leadership. This
does not require that judges as a class be any better than Congressmen,
Senators, executives or businessmen. It does no more than recognize
that, given jurisdiction of a case, those judges who do have qualities
of leadership may have the opportunity of solving a problem which
other responsible lawmaking bodies have not been able to solve, often
because of the obstruction of minorities or the indifference of the
citizenry. And it may happen that, because of the character of the
question, the judicial process is well-suited to devise a solution (though,
as was true of the reapportionment problem, it may be very ill-suited).
Be that as it may, the solution is, as is true of all solutions, only an
experiment. If the solution is put in constitutional terms it may be
at least qualified by legislation, and it may be set aside-or modifiedby constitutional amendment, later judicial decision, or popular nulli-
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fication. And as is true of all acts of leadership, a judicial action may
provoke, by way of reaction or reinforcement, action at the legislative
level. Thus, though judicial intervention may cause popular responsibility to atrophy it may, on the contrary, energize it as we have seen
in the enormous legislative movement generated by the school desegregation decision.'
What I have said is relevant to the question whether judicial
lawmaking is contrary to democratic theory. There still remains the
historical argument against such judicial action. It will be said that
the Supreme Court has, without constitutional warrant, defied the
democratically declared will of the country. This assumes that a
decision which cannot be rationally derived from constitutional texts
is an abuse of power, though I know principled, law-minded persons
who are prepared to accept an occasional decision-the reapportionment
decision " for example-which,

in their opinion,

cannot be so

What one of them would call a coup de main may be
grounded'
the only workable way out of a serious impasse.
I suspect that there are very few, even among those most critical
of the Court, who do not admire some aspects of its performance. This,
I think, would be true of the Court's protection of the national market
from discriminating state legislation. They might argue that this job
could have been better done by Congress, and that had the Court not
intervened Congress would have been compelled to act. Their preference would be for the more democratically achieved solution, and they
might be so principled as to insist that even the not unlikely failure
of Congress to act would be better than judicial tutelage. Or they
might see this as an exception and argue, as Holmes did, that democracy is not too much to be trusted or insisted upon where the controversies arise out of intra-federal clashes of interest. But would there
not be fairly broad support-even among the critics-for the judicial
enforcement of procedural protections? Perhaps even in this area the
problem is in some measure a federal one. A great deal of the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court reflects, more or less directly, a
determination to impose national standards upon recalcitrant statesparticularly those most embroiled in the Negro problem, though this
line of decision in its later-day manifestations has been directed against
the entire country. This development reflects in part the fact that the
23
24

Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

" 5 Though the striking down of specifically discriminating aspects, see, e.g.,

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), or irrational classifications, see, e.g.,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), is not difficult to rationalize in 14th and 15th
amendment terms, the flat, unmodulated one-man-one-vote formula may be explicable
simply as a convenient administrative solution, once given judicial intervention.
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need for protection of the Negro minority is no longer confined to the
states of the Confederacy. Judges such as Brandeis who preached
judicial restraint did not hesitate to extend the reach of the judicial
power to the protection of "fundamental rights" (a phrase not to be
found in the Constitution) comprised within the term "liberty." '
Those who distrust the Supreme Court as an institution are entitled to rely heavily on the roughly thirty years of judicial nullification
There were earlier
of social legislation between 1905 and 1937.2
decisions in Dred Scott,"8 Hepburn v. Griswold2 (quickly and precariously atoned) and Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,"0 but
nothing quite equals in extent and significance the Court's quartercentury veto of welfare legislation, legislation which all of the modem
democracies have found necessary for the maintenence of social welfare
and political harmony. It is a heavy indictment. And a few, at least,
of those same critics might believe that some of the Court's current
decisions would justify further counts in the indictment. But there
are probably few critics who would contend that, given our Constitution
with its scheme of a federal government and the Bill of Rights, the
Court's performance is on balance so bad that it would be better to
do without it.
But this, it will be said, is not the alternative. It is admitted that
we must have the Court to administer justice. It may in the course
of performing this job do some good things, but since it does so many
bad things, or is at best so undependable, we should restrict its jurisdiction to the minimum needed to perform its basic task. I would
reply that the requirement of a Hohfeldian plaintiff is an arbitrary
limitation which does not correlate with the potential for good or evil.
The Court's power to do good may arise as well in suits brought by
ideological plaintiffs; and its bad decisions may be and have been
rendered in cases with traditional plaintiffs (after all, it has, almost
without exception, required such plaintiffs).
It may be said that the lack of a traditional plaintiff suggests that
the issue is essentially "political" rather than "legal," but I do not
think that this assertion is borne out by the cases. Whether a tax or
a regulation "burdens" interstate commerce is, of course, raised in a
case in which some person is the object of the questioned tax or regu2

6Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (dissenting opinion); see
Jaffe,27 Was Brandeis an Activist?, 80 HARV. L. REv. 986, 991-93 (1967).
From Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), to West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
28
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2975 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869), overruled in Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 457 (1871).
30 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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lation. The issue, however, is quite unlike the ordinary claim for
justice according to law, either in its dimensions or in the standards
applicable for its decision. There are, indeed, as many cases as one
would want to demonstrate that the character of the plaintiff and his
claim for justice have very little relation to the kind of issue to be
decided and the fitness of the judicial process for disposition of the issue.
32
Myers v. United States " and Humphrey's Executor v. United States
are good examples. In Meyers, the President removed a postmaster
without satisfying the statutory requirement of the consent of the
Senate. The postmaster sued for his salary. The Court thereupon
found it necessary to decide a great political controversy which went
back to the very beginning of the republic. Could the legislature limit
the removal power of the President? The true litigants here were the
Congress and the President--or if you will, the Presidency. The Court
invited Senator George Wharton Pepper to appear as amicus and no
doubt received as much enlightenment from him as from counsel for
the parties.'
I do not say that the Supreme Court is the exclusive or the
necessary forum for the decision of "issues of constitutionality." There
are many such issues which it cannot, and should not, decide. One
of my colleagues insists that the Court never decides whether a statute
is "constitutional." It decides nothing more nor less than that a
certain statute cannot serve as the authoritative premise for a decision
in the case of A v. B. No doubt this is technically correct, however far
it departs from the sense in which the Court and the country conceive
the judicial function. But even if the premise be conceded, it is still
undeniable that more often than not the issue before the Court will be
a public controversy, the dimensions and consequences of which may
be immeasurably larger than its legal effect upon the parties to the
case.
It is not, I say again, the thesis of this article that the courts are
general courts for the decision of constitutional issues. Frothingham
v. Mellon 3 illustrates the point I would make. It is the chief authority
for the proposition that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction of
a taxpayer's suit; and it was at least part of the stated rationale of the
31272 U.S. 52 (1926) ; cf. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F.
Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (Jehovah's Witnesses have standing to raise in a class
action constitutionality of giving blood transfusions to children against expressed objections of parents).
32 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (removal of a Federal Trade Commissioner).
33See 272 U.S. 52, 176-77 (1926). The briefs and oral arguments are summarized in the report of the case, id. at 56-106. In addition, S. Doc. No. 174, 69th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1926), contains the record in the case, the briefs used on reargument,
and a stenographic transcript of the oral argument.
34262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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decision that such a suit is not a case or controversy. But the Court
notes that the issue involved was not apt for judicial decision, that it
was, to categorize it, a "political question." Thus, in the companion
case of Massachusetts v. Mellon,3 5 the Court also refused to take jurisdiction. That decision, of course, also rested in part on the proposition
that Massachusetts was not a proper plaintiff, but one senses that it was
the character of the controversy as much as the parties to it which
explains the decision.
The Frothinghamcase can be used to show that the very fact that
there is no conventional plaintiff to bring a suit attests the "political"
character of the issue. But I do not think it proves so much. Cases,
imagined or real, concerning the establishment clause offer a test of the
proposition. The Court in the busing, 6 school prayer,3" and Sunday
law cases 3 8 has treated establishment issues as justiciable. Current
controversy concerns payments and gifts of one sort or another to
institutions owned or directed by religious authorities; the present suits
are suits by taxpayers to enjoin payments. But suppose that a fiscal
officer refused to make payment to an institution on the ground that
to do so would violate the establishment clause, and the institution
brings mandamus.39 Here we would have a conventional lawsuit, at
least in terms of parties plaintiff and defendant. Given the establishment decisions, it does not seem a tenable position that the issue is not
of a justiciable character. The issue can be compared, for example,
to one which the Court was recently asked to adjudicate,"0 the "legality"
of the Vietnamese hostilities. That issue has all the characteristics
which we associate with a "political question"-the indeterminate character of the putatively applicable legal principles, the difficulty of
formulating rules, the factual complexities (among which would be
the relevance of "classified" material), and the likely resistance of
The
both the executive and the legislature to judicial intervention.'
cases raising these questions did not lack conventional parties: the
35 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
86 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
37 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
38

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

39 In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1967), prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 1031 (1968), certain boards of education sought
a declaration that certain expenditures of funds would violate the establishment clause.
The New York Court of Appeals decided 4-3 in favor of constitutionality. Curiously,
only one of the majority judges believed that the plaintiff school officials had standing.
He and the three dissenters made a majority in favor of standing.
4 0
Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934

(1967).
41
JAFFE

For the concept of "political question" as it functions in standing cases, see
490.
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issues were being raised by defendants whose liability to punishment
could arguably be determined by their adjudication.
The burden of my argument, so far, has been that there are no
compelling constitutional reasons for denying jurisdiction of citizen
and taxpayer actions. It is almost impossible any longer to contend
that a Hohfeldian plaintiff is a necessary element of a case or controversy. The Court has clearly sanctioned statutory provisions allowing
actions by plaintiffs whose legal status is not in issue. There is nothing
in our experience or in our understanding of human nature which shows
that such plaintiffs will not be effective advocates. The inherent
justiciability of the issue does not bear any necessary relation to the
character of the plaintiff; conventional plaintiffs proffer issues of a
broad, public, more or less "political" character, some of which the
Court adjudicates and some of which it does not. To be sure, it is
possible that many of the issues generated by non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs
will be political, but there will be many that are not.
Granted all this, what is the case for allowing these suits? There
are those, as I have said, who on balance believe that the lawmaking
activities of the courts are undemocratic; and that, on balance, the
results have not been good. They would restrict the courts to the
least possible lawmaking consistent with the administration of justice.
They would not think it a great pity that thereby an occasional "happy"
decision would be lost to us. They would argue that, after all, in the
case of aid to church schools we have had a highly considered democratic judgment, the judgment of substantial majorities. These majorities have not been completely blind to the constitutional issues, even
if they have not totally insulated those issues from the considerations
of policy and expediency. If we are insisting that there be a decision
of the constitutional question cleansed of all such impurities are we not
exaggerating the extent to which the constitutional issue can be thus
insulated, or at least making something of a fetish of constitutional
purity?
Is it relevant that there may be a widespread desire for a judicial
pronouncement? There may, for example, be a national commitment
to "legality," to "constitutionality"-a feeling, as it were, for the
regularity that, in the minds of many, is associated with judicial determination. In my opinion such feelings are not irrelevant to the definition of the judicial function. Our institutions, whether legislative,
executive or judicial, should reflect in the long run our needs and our
expectations. It cannot be maintained that since the legislative, executive and judicial functions are defined in the Constitution, popular expectations are irrelevant. The definitions are broad and imprecise and
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do not preclude the almost continuous-if subtle and imperceptibledevelopment of function which characterizes the history of constitutions.
Yet I would not argue that popular expectation of the judicial role in
constitutional adjudication is determinative. For the most part, the
degree of expectation is not measurable and is highly variable. There
are those whose usual attitude calls for judicial determination of constitutional issues, those who would welcome it at times and reject it
at others (usually for personal or political reasons), and those who
have never thought about it. One might conclude that the problem
should be solved in terms of formal legislative action taken to demonstrate the desire of a majority for such judicial determination. The
statute could be one granting jurisdiction only of the issues raised by
a particular law, or it could be a statute (such as exist in many states)
empowering the courts to entertain taxpayer actions.
There are important reasons for allowing citizen suits. Some
of these have less application to questions of constitutionality than to
questions of the legality (the vires) of administrative and official action.
It has now become a commonplace that the individual citizen in our
vast, multitudinous complexes feels excluded from government. Thus,
while governmental power expands, individual participation in the
exercise of power contracts. This is unfortunate because the feeling
of helplessness and exclusion is itself an evil, and because the individuals and organized groups are a source of information, experience,
and wisdom. It has been remarked that administrative agencies are
sometimes captured by particular interests. This assertion has been,
in my opinion, somewhat overdone, but there can be no question that
there is danger that officials and their staffs will become attached to
certain positions and to certain accommodations which narrow their
vision. For these reasons procedural devices, which enable citizen
groups to participate in the decision-making process and to invoke
judicial controls, are very valuable. There is no better illustration of
this than two recent cases. The first, already mentioned here,4 allowed
a conservation group, heavily financed by a public spirited citizen, to
put forward its position with great effectiveness. In the other, Office
of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,43 the Negro
churches of Jackson, Mississippi, were held to have standing as "persons
aggrieved" to question the procedural regularity of an order of the
Federal Communications Commission involving the obligation of a
broadcasting licensee to provide local service to the Negro community
of the city.
42
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
note 13 supra and accompanying text.
43 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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The judicial process as a vehicle for self-government is exemplified
in these holdings. From the very beginning, both our Constitution and
our practice has sought to protect the individual qua individual and qua
member of a minority from the abuse of power by the majority or by
government in the name of the majority, despite the fact that majority
rule through representation is the central institution of our democracy.
Furthermore, democracy in our tradition emphasizes citizen participation as much as it does majority rule. Citizen participation is not
simply a vehicle for minority protection, but a creative element in
government and lawmaking. The usual taxpayer and citizen suit is
thoroughly consistent with the primacy of majority rule. The issue
will be the statutory authority of the official action, and the lawsuit
itself will be prescribed by statute. The conservation and broadcasting
cases emerge, then, as excellent examples of the lawsuit as a form of
citizen participation within a framework established by majority rule.
Where there is no statutory or common law basis for a taxpayer
suit the problem itself is, in the final analysis, a constitutional one.
One might distinguish between cases in which, on the one hand, the
citizen or taxpayer asserting the constitutional claim, though not immediately affected, is seen as a member of a class entitled to constitutional protection and, on the other, one who is not so situated.
I coniess that the distinction is not as obvious as it may sound since it is
arguable that all constitutional prescriptions are intended for the protection of that class of citizens which is at any one time disadvantaged
by the failure to observe the constitutional requirement. Thus, the
separation of powers, the distribution of powers between the states and
the federal government, and procedural provisions for the exercise of
power (e.g., the presidential veto and methods of constitutional amendment) are meant to protect us all. But there is, I believe, a sense in
which the protections of the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments differ from these, the clearest expression of which is the prohibition of discrimination by reason of race, color or previous condition
of servitude.
These protections do not ordinarily present any problems of the
sort that we are here considering. If Jones, a Negro, is denied housing
because he is a Negro or if Smith, a Jehovah's Witness, is imprisoned
because he will not salute the flag, we need not further define his
position to give him relief. There are, however, cases where discrimination or repression is latent, where no particular individual is as
yet a demonstrable object of such unconstitutional action. It is alleged,
for example, that a civil service system discriminates against Negroes
otherwise eligible. It is alleged that a threat to draft individuals who
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In neither of these
actively protest the draft discourages free speech.'
cases is any particular individual the object of the illegal action. But
if there is to be judicial protection of the individual from the impact
of these unconstitutional exercises of power, it may be that an action
by a plaintiff whose credentials are something less than traditional
must be allowed.
Yet none of these situations quite covers the case of the taxpayer
who alleges that a payment of money to a religious school violates the
establishment clause. He will never become the object of an unconstitutional exercise of power in a way such as is the Negro, the Jehovah's
Witness, or the silenced draft protestor. He is nevertheless a member
of a class, a group, "a minority" if you will, for whose benefit a constitutional protection or limitation has been devised. The prohibition
against establishment was meant to protect non-established religions
and, as now interpreted, to protect, also those without religious affiliation. We might go on to argue that an offense to such a group is an
offense to the conscience of each of the persons who constitute the
group because each is forced to participate in the official support of a
religion. Perhaps this argument brings us around full circle to the
proposition that the "taxpayer" is a traditional plaintiff in disguise,
though the nature of his cause of action, to wit, the unconstitutional
assault on his conscience, 45 is novel.4"
This may be the ultimate resolution of the problem. It should be
clear by now that the requirement of a Hohfeldian plaintiff is a requirement no longer-if it ever was-justifiable. It has not been the
44

Cf. Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967), noted in 81 HAv.

L. REv. 685 (1968).
45 The reapportionment decision, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), may be a
close analogue, stronger in some respects but weaker in others. The vice there of
the condemned arrangements was under-representation of certain classes of voters.
To bring the decision within the logical framework of the equal protection clause it
was necessary to hold that each under-represented voter was the object of unreasonable discrimination-that his vote was improperly "diluted." Yet the plaintiff in
a reapportionment suit bears little relation, analytically or functionally, to the typical
plaintiff. The notion of dilution of any particular vote is as abstract and indefinable
as the effect on a taxpayer of a questioned action requiring a modicum of expenditure. The effect of an unpredictable reapportionment on the plaintiff's vote is
immeasurable and unknowable, and even may be adverse. The plaintiff in these cases
represents one or more classes of voters defined in broad political terms-the city,
the suburb, the Negro vote. No doubt the reapportionment cases are msi generis.
For one thing, they are cases of an oppressed majority and, whatever else may be
said against Baker v. Carr, it is difficult to condemn it either as a departure from
democratic theory or a challenge to majority rule. On the other hand, the plaintiff
in a reapportionment action cannot, as is true of the plaintiff in the school case,
point to a specific constitutional limitation, a limitation which is, in fact, intended to
protect the position of persons such as himself.
46 In my opinion, a statute such as that hypothesized at the beginning of the paragraph does not violate the establishment clause or any other constitutional guarantee.
I contend, nevertheless, that the plaintiff has standing.
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purpose here to argue that the requirement of case or controversy, or
the requirement that a question for judicial decision not be "political"
in nature, should be overturned; but the plaintiff's Hohfeldian nature
(or lack of it) has no bearing on these questions. As much if not more
than at any previous period in our history, society has been recognizing
the importance of the individual's conscience. Explicitly as well as
implicitly, the courts should do the same.

